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FORGOTTEN CASES: WORTHEN V. THOMAS
DAVID F. FORTE**
ABSTRACT
According to received opinion, the case of the Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. 
Blaisdell, decided in 1934, laid to rest any force the Contracts Clause of the United 
States Constitution had to limit state legislation that affected existing contracts. But 
the Supreme Court’s subsequent decisions belies that claim. In fact, a few months 
later, the Court unanimously decided Worthen v. Thomas, which reaffirmed the 
vitality of the Contract Clause. Over the next few years, in twenty cases, the Court 
limited the reach of Blaisdell and confirmed the limiting force of the Contract Clause 
on state legislation. Only after World War II did the Court abandon the Contract 
Clause by interpreting Blaisdell well beyond its original intention. The Court in the 
1930s had devised a workable formula that could be still workable today.
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I. INTRODUCTION
There is a standard narrative about the demise of the Contract Clause. In January 
1934, the Supreme Court decided Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell.1
Constitutional Law scholars and textbooks say that the coalition of justices that formed 
the majority in Blaisdell withdrew the Court from monitoring the economic policies 
of the state and federal governments.2 Blaisdell began the retreat by taking away the 
limitation to state economic legislation that the Contracts Clause had previously 
                                                          
* Editor’s Note: A substantial portion of this Article was previously published in the Federalist 
Society Review. Cleveland State Law Review publishes this expanded Article with the 
permission of the author and the Federalist Society. For the original publication, see David F. 
Forte, Forgotten Cases: Worthen v. Thomas and the Contract Clause, 18 FEDERALIST SOCIETY 
REV. 48 (2017), https://fedsoc.org/commentary/publications/forgotten-cases-worthen-v-
thomas-and-the-contract-clause.
** Professor of Law, Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. I am 
indebted to Linda M. Young for her research assistance and to Professors Robert Nagle and 
Stephen Lazarus for their advice.
1 Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
2 See id. at 443–44.
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imposed.3 However, as the narrative continues, it was a harbinger of much more. Soon, 
other constitutional dominos would fall. Two months later, the same five-Justice 
majority—Justices Hughes, Roberts, Stone, Brandeis, and Cardozo—killed the 
substantive due process right of contract in Nebbia v. New York,4 and they buried it 
three terms later in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish.5 Finally, the same line-up laid to 
rest restrictions on Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause in NLRB v. Jones 
& Laughlin,6 completing the defeat of any constitutional restrictions on economic 
legislation.
But the story told by the textbooks is not true. Chief Justice Hughes and his 
majority did not kill or even mortally wound the Contract Clause in Blaisdell in 1934; 
five months later, the Court unanimously reaffirmed the vitality of the Contract Clause 
in Worthen v. Thomas.7
II. BEFORE WORTHEN
By 1934, the Contracts Clause had had a long and not altogether coherent 
interpretive history. Under Supreme Court precedents, the Clause applied both to 
public contracts, in which the state was a party, and to private contracts.8 It also applied 
                                                          
3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (“No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation 
of Contracts . . . .”). For example, in KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 19th ed. 2016), there is a large excerpt of 
Hughes’s opinion, a small snippet of Sutherland’s dissent, and an implication that Blaisdell
cleared the decks of nearly all Contract Clause claims, with Worthen mentioned as only an 
exception. Id. at 639. In GEOFFREY STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Vicki Been et al. eds., 
7th ed. 2013), following a large excerpt from Blaisdell, the authors write, “[a]fter Blaisdell, what 
does the [C]ontract [C]lause prohibit? The answer appears to be very little.” Id. at 980. In this 
volume containing a plethora of cases, Worthen is missing. In ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Vicki Been et al. eds., 4th ed. 2013), Blaisdell is excerpted following a 
note that “the Contract Clause was made superfluous by the Court’s protection of freedom of 
contract under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.” Id. at 647. 
Worthen is missing.
4 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (upholding the conviction of a storekeeper for 
selling milk below the price set by the state in the face of a substantive due process challenge).
5 W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding a state law setting a 
minimum wage for women despite a substantive due process challenge).
6 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
7 W.B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426 (1934). The Court heard arguments for 
Blaisdell on November 8–9, 1933 and issued its decision on January 8, 1934. The Court decided 
Worthen on May 28, 1934. In his compendious work on the Contract Clause, James W. Ely, Jr. 
notes some of the limiting language in Blaisdell and states that “the Blaisdell opinion did not 
sound the immediate death knell for the [C]ontract [C]lause,” mentioning Worthen v. Thomas,
but he still credits Blaisdell as the source of the effective end of Contract Clause protections.
JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE CONTRACT CLAUSE 224 (2016). This Article demonstrates, I aver, that 
Blaisdell and Worthen created a workable compromise that was not upset until Justices Black 
and Frankfurter made more of Blaisdell than even Chief Justice Hughes would have wanted.
8 Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87 (1810) (holding that a state’s repeal of a land grant law was 
unconstitutional under the Contract Clause because it constituted the taking of land from 
subsequent bona fide purchasers).
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to state charters of corporations,9 although state obligations under such charters were 
to be strictly construed.10 The Clause was primarily retrospective, but contracts were 
subject to existing state laws when formed.11 The Clause neither limited the state’s 
inherent power of eminent domain12 nor prevented a state from adjusting its regime of 
legal remedies so long as the newly imposed remedy did not materially impair a 
party’s substantive rights under a contract.13 However, a state could use its police 
power to make previously concluded contracts illegal as contra bona mores,14 and the 
state could not alienate its reserved police powers to prevent it from legislating for the 
public welfare,15 including economic welfare.16 Within each of the aforementioned 
doctrines, exceptions and even contradictions were present in the Court’s precedents.
Then came Blaisdell. To forestall a massive foreclosure crisis in the midst of the 
Great Depression, the Minnesota State Legislature passed the Minnesota Mortgage 
Moratorium Act in 1933.17 Under the Act, after a lender foreclosed a property, the 
mortgagor could have his redemption period extended.18 During that time, he could 
cure the loan default.19 Moreover, during the extended redemption period, the 
mortgagor could remain in possession of the property, but had to pay the mortgagee 
the property’s fair market value in rent.20 The Act’s available benefits lapsed after two 
                                                          
9 Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819) (upholding the sanctity of 
Dartmouth College’s original charter under the Contract Clause, thus invalidating a state statute 
designed to force the college to become a public college).
10 Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420 (1837) 
(holding that a charter contract should be interpreted as narrowly as possible, and that a contract 
between the state and a bridge company did not confer exclusive rights).
11 Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213 (1827) (holding that the Contract Clause prevented states 
from passing laws affecting contracts already signed, but holding that laws affecting future 
contracts were presumed to be part of the contract).
12 W. River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. 507 (1848) (holding that the Contract Clause did 
not limit a state’s ability to take a bridge in eminent domain, even when the original contract
granted an exclusive right that would be violated by the state’s taking).
13 Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122 (1819) (holding that states may pass bankruptcy 
laws so long as such laws do not impair the obligation of the contract).
14 Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1880) (holding that a state’s police power extends to 
the regulation of lotteries as a matter of public health and public morals).
15 Chi. & Alton R.R. Co. v. Tranbarger, 238 U.S. 67 (1915) (upholding a state law 
penalizing railroad owners who failed to maintain drainage openings in railroad embankments, 
stating that the police power is not alienable, and contract rights are subject to the fair exercise 
of police power).
16 Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, amended by 219 U.S. 575 (1911) (upholding 
a state banking law requiring contributions to state depositors’ guaranty fund as a lawful 
exercise of the state police power).
17 Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 415 (1934).
18 Id. at 416.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 425.
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years.21 In 1934, the Act came before the Supreme Court to be tested under the 
Contracts Clause.22
Blaisdell presented two important questions. First, could a state use its police 
power to restructure economic relationships in the private sphere even though that 
restructuring might affect contractual rights and duties under existing contracts?23
Second, did the state’s adjustment of remedies for contractual breach materially alter 
the obligations and rights of the parties to the contract?24
Courts had long debated the question of whether the state’s police power extended 
not only to health, safety, and morals, but also to “the general welfare,” including 
economic betterment.25 By 1934, the issue had been well settled in favor of its 
permissibility.26 Nonetheless, when a state legislated on economic matters, the impact 
on contracts was often not merely incidental, as when the state abates a nuisance, but 
quite direct, thus involving the Contract Clause.27 This is why the appellant in Blaisdell
spent much effort arguing the legitimacy of economic legislation, and presumably why 
Chief Justice Hughes devoted a great deal of his opinion to justifying Minnesota’s 
legislation as a legitimate exercise of the State’s police power.28 Hughes concluded 
that the police power permitted the State to take drastic economic measures in a 
situation of dire emergency and that the law’s extension of the period of redemption 
was justified to stave off a catastrophic collapse of the mortgage market, the Contract 
Clause notwithstanding.29
In dissent, Justice Sutherland, joined by Justices McReynolds, Van Devanter, and 
Butler, did not deny that economic regulation was within the State’s police power and 
                                                          
21 Id. at 416.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 425.
24 Id. at 430–31.
25 E.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387, 395 (1926) (upholding 
an ordinance excluding business-related buildings, including apartment buildings, from certain
residential neighborhoods; stating that the exercise of police power was justifiable as protecting 
health, safety, morals, and general welfare; and emphasizing that the increasingly complex 
world justified increasingly restrictive local laws).
26 E.g., Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. City of Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548, 558 (1914) (“For it is 
settled that neither the ‘[C]ontract’ [C]lause nor the ‘[D]ue [P]rocess’ [C]lause has the effect of 
overriding the power of the State to establish all regulations that are reasonably necessary to 
secure the health, safety, good order, comfort, or general welfare of the community . . . .”); 
Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480–81 (1905) (“This power, which in its various 
ramifications is known as the police power, is an exercise of the sovereign right of the 
Government to protect the lives, health, morals, comfort and general welfare of the people, and 
is paramount to any rights under contracts between individuals. . . . Although [the Act] was not 
an exercise of that power in its ordinarily accepted sense of protecting the health, lives and 
morals of the community, it is defensible in its broader meaning of providing for the general 
welfare of the people . . . .”).
27 Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 438.
28 Id. at 439–40.
29 Id. at 445.
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that there was an emergency.30 Yet he stated unequivocally, “the difficulty is that the 
contract impairment clause forbids state action under any circumstances, if it have the 
effect of impairing the obligation of contracts.”31 In addition, Sutherland insisted, the 
original purpose of the Contracts Clause was to forbid precisely the kinds of remedies 
that Minnesota’s State Legislature imposed, as those remedies invaded the core set of 
obligations of the contracting parties.32 To justify his position, Sutherland marshaled 
extensive historical evidence from the founding period.33
To counter Sutherland’s daunting arguments, Hughes took two tacks.34 The first 
was to deny the constitutional relevance of historical evidence altogether.35 Hughes 
asserted:
It is no answer to say that this public need was not apprehended a century 
ago, or to insist that what the provision of the Constitution meant to the 
vision of that day it must mean to the vision of our time. If by the statement 
that what the Constitution meant at the time of its adoption it means to-day 
[sic], it is intended to say that the great clauses of the Constitution must be 
confined to the interpretation which the framers, with the conditions and 
outlook of their time, would have placed upon them, the statement carries 
its own refutation. It was to guard against such a narrow conception that 
Chief Justice Marshall uttered the memorable warning: “We must never 
forget that it is a constitution we are expounding” (McCulloch v. Maryland,
4 Wheat. 316, 17 U.S. 407); “a constitution intended to endure for ages to 
come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human 
affairs.”36
In rejecting the relevance of the Framers’ interpretation of the clauses of the 
Constitution, Hughes’s position would have destroyed the very relevance of the 
Constitution. Hughes’s opinion would have been more defensible if he followed 
Justice Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland37 and wrote instead that the 
Constitution need not be confined to the applications of the clauses that the Framers 
might have had in mind while drafting the Constitutional text in question.
Hughes’s second tack was weightier. He argued that the purpose of the Contract 
Clause was to protect the integrity of a bona fide contract from material disruption by 
                                                          
30 Id. at 473 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
31 Id.
32 Id. at 473–74.
33 Id. at 453 (“The history of the times, the state of things existing when the provision was 
framed and adopted should be looked to in order to ascertain the mischief and the remedy. . . . 
And, if the meaning be at all doubtful, the doubt should be resolved, wherever reasonably 
possible to do so, in a way to forward the evident purpose with which the provision was 
adopted.” (citations omitted)).
34 Id. at 427–28, 443.
35 Id. at 443.
36 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819)).
37 See McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 371 (explaining that it would have been impossible for the 
Founders to foresee and incorporate into the Constitution the variety of circumstances in 
America’s ever-changing and ever-improving political society).
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the state.38 He emphasized that the law permitting a temporary delay in foreclosure 
actually preserved the underlying mortgage relationship between the parties:
The statute does not impair the integrity of the mortgage indebtedness. The 
obligation for interest remains. The statute does not affect the validity of 
the sale or the right of a mortgagee-purchaser to title in fee, or his right to 
obtain a deficiency judgment, if the mortgagor fails to redeem within the 
prescribed period. Aside from the extension of time, the other conditions of 
redemption are unaltered.39
Moreover, the purpose of the law was to stabilize the mortgage market so that 
thousands of other mortgages would not be put at risk.40 Hughes asserted:
It cannot be maintained that the constitutional prohibition should be so 
construed as to prevent limited and temporary interpositions with respect 
to the enforcement of contracts if made necessary by a great public calamity 
such as fire, flood, or earthquake. The reservation of state power 
appropriate to such extraordinary conditions may be deemed to be as much 
a part of all contracts as is the reservation of state power to protect the 
public interest in the other situations to which we have referred. And, if 
state power exists to give temporary relief from the enforcement of 
contracts in the presence of disasters due to physical causes such as fire, 
flood or earthquake, that power cannot be said to be nonexistent when the 
urgent public need demanding such relief is produced by other and 
economic causes.41
In his dissent, Justice Sutherland recognized that Hughes had dangerously 
interpreted Marshall’s notion of an adaptable Constitution.42 He honed in on Hughes’s 
mistake, stating:
The provisions of the Federal Constitution, undoubtedly, are pliable in the 
sense that in appropriate cases they have the capacity of bringing within 
their grasp every new condition which falls within their meaning. But, their 
meaning is changeless; it is only their application which is extensible.43
The Framers wrote the Contract Clause precisely to prevent this kind of remedy in this 
kind of emergency. Minnesota’s Act was exactly the type of legislation that the Clause 
removed from state discretion.44 Clearly alarmed at the majority’s view, Sutherland 
predicted that permitting Minnesota to make such a reform in these circumstances 
would be a wedge for further and more extensive incursions into the protections that 
                                                          
38 Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 427–28.
39 Id. at 425.
40 EDWARD VINCENT MURPHY, CONG. RES. SERV., RL34653, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF A 
MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE MORATORIUM at summary (2008).
41 Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 439–40 (citations omitted).
42 Id. at 448–49 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
43 Id. at 451 (emphasis added).
44 Id. at 472.
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the Constitution provided.45 Yet, only a few months later, in Worthen v. Thomas,
Hughes and Sutherland renewed their debate, but with a markedly different result than 
in Blaisdell.46
III. ENTER WORTHEN
In Little Rock, Arkansas, Mr. and Mrs. Ralph Thomas owned a harness company 
and rented their business premises from W.B. Worthen Company.47 Worthen brought 
suit when the Thomases failed to keep up with their rental payments48 and gained a 
judgment of $1,200.49 Ralph Thomas subsequently passed away, and Worthen 
discovered that Thomas had a life insurance policy worth $5,000 payable to his wife.50
Worthen then served a writ of garnishment on the insurance company.51 Thereafter, 
the Arkansas State Legislature passed a law that exempted from process of attachment 
any proceeds of a life or accident insurance policy.52 Due to the new law, the insurance 
company moved to dismiss the writ of garnishment; Worthen answered, asserting the 
Arkansas law contravened the Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution.53
The Supreme Court unanimously agreed with Worthen.54 Again, Hughes authored 
the Court’s opinion, joined by Justices Roberts, Stone, Brandeis, and Cardozo.55 He 
took pains to show why Blaisdell constituted a narrow exception to the sweep of the 
Contract Clause’s prohibition.56 He no longer claimed that the interpretation of the 
meaning of the Constitution changed with new circumstances.57 Rather, he fashioned 
a test—analogous to what later courts would denominate a strict scrutiny test—to 
apply whenever a state sought to justify an action that would normally constitute an 
impairment of an existing contract.58 He contended:
We held that when the exercise of the reserved power of the State, in order 
to meet public need because of a pressing public disaster, relates to the 
enforcement of existing contracts, that action must be limited by reasonable 
                                                          
45 Id. at 448.
46 W.B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426, 426, 434 (1934).
47 Id. at 429.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 429–30.
53 Id. at 430.
54 Id. at 434.
55 Id. at 429; Richard E. Berg-Andersson, Justices of the United States Supreme Court,
GREEN PAPERS, https://www.thegreenpapers.com/Hx/JusticesUSSC.html (last updated Oct. 2, 
2017).
56 Worthen, 292 U.S. at 433.
57 Id.
58 Id.
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conditions appropriate to the emergency. . . . Accordingly, in the case of 
Blaisdell, we sustained the Minnesota mortgage moratorium law in the light 
of the temporary and conditional relief which the legislation granted.59
In Worthen, Mrs. Thomas argued that the State merely adjusted certain remedies with 
only an incidental impact on existing contracts.60 The Court found her argument
“unavailing” because there were—as later Courts might put it—no narrowly drawn 
limitations to meet a compelling need.61 The Court stated:
There is no limitation of amount, however large. Nor is there any limitation 
as to beneficiaries, if they are residents of the State. There is no restriction 
with respect to particular circumstances or relations. . . . The profits of a 
business, if invested in life insurance, may thus be withdrawn from the 
pursuit of creditors to whatever extent desired.62
This time, Hughes quoted Justice Marshall—a strong defender of the broad sweep of 
the Contract Clause—more appropriately from his opinion in Sturges v. 
Crowninshield: “Future acquisitions are, therefore, liable for contracts; and to release 
them from this liability impairs their obligation.”63
Justice Sutherland and his three allies concurred “unreservedly” in the judgment.64
However, Sutherland insisted that the situation of Blaisdell compared to that in 
Worthen was no different.65 Arguing that the Contract Clause must not have an 
“emergency” (or “strict scrutiny”) exception, he stated:
We were unable then, as we are now, to concur in the view that an 
emergency can ever justify, or, what is really the same thing, can ever 
furnish an occasion for justifying, a nullification of the constitutional 
restriction upon state power in respect of the impairment of contractual 
obligations. . . . We reject as unsound and dangerous doctrine, threatening 
the stability of the deliberately framed and wise provisions of the 
Constitution, the notion that violations of those provisions may be 
measured by the length of time they are to continue or the extent of the 
infraction, and that only those of long duration or of large importance are 
to be held bad. Such was not the intention of those who framed and adopted 
that instrument.66
IV. THE WORTHEN RULE PREVAILS
Was Worthen just a temporary hiccup on the way to granting states an unfettered 
right to exercise their police power to affect the terms of pre-existing contracts?  Or 
                                                          
59 Id. at 433–34.
60 Id. at 432.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 431.
63 Id. at 432 (quoting Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122, 198 (1819)).
64 Id. at 434 (Sutherland, J., concurring).
65 Id.
66 Id. at 434–35.
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was Blaisdell the blip? In subsequent Contract Clause cases in the 1930s, whenever 
Blaisdell or Worthen was mentioned, there is no doubt that whatever tension there was 
between the two cases was resolved in favor of the latter. For example, a week after 
the Court decided Worthen, Justice Brandeis noted in his opinion in Lynch v. United 
States that “[c]ontracts between individuals or corporations are impaired within 
the meaning of the Constitution . . . whenever the right to enforce them by legal 
process is taken away or materially lessened.”67 It is significant that Brandeis, who 
sided with Chief Justice Hughes in Blaisdell, now emphasized Worthen and the strong 
defense of the Contract Clause in Justice Sutherland’s dissent in Blaisdell.68
Worthen’s dominance is not difficult to understand. First, Worthen was 
unanimously decided.69 Second, Chief Justice Hughes took pains to limit the impact 
of Blaisdell’s rule to truly emergency situations where a state used very narrow and 
temporary means to uphold the fundamental contractual relationship between the 
parties.70 In fact, from Worthen onward, the Court saw an uptick in Contract Clause 
cases.71 From the time Hughes became Chief Justice in 1930 until the Court decided 
Blaisdell in 1934, the Court heard eight Contract Clause cases.72 Yet from 1934’s 
Worthen through 1937, twenty Contract Clause cases came before the Court, and the 
Court struck down the state law at issue in five of them.73 In sum, Blaisdell did not 
signal the Court’s retreat from considering Contract Clause cases or its reluctance to 
decide against the State.
W.B. Worthen Company returned to the Supreme Court in 1935 in W.B. Worthen 
v. Kavanaugh.74 The Court once again unanimously ruled in favor of Worthen.75
Arkansas law permitted municipalities to issue bonds to pay for improvements to city 
                                                          
67 Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 580, 580 n.8 (1934) (citing Worthen, 292 U.S. 
246, “and cases cited by Mr. Justice Sutherland in Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell.”).
68 Id. at 580 n.8.
69 Worthen, 292 U.S. at 426.
70 Id. at 433.
71 See BENJAMIN FLETCHER WRIGHT, JR., THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 98
(1937).
72 Id. at 99.
73 Id.; Hale v. State Bd. of Assessment & Review, 302 U.S. 95 (1937); Dodge v. Bd. of 
Educ., 302 U.S. 74 (1937); Wright v. Vinton Branch of Mountain Tr. Bank, 300 U.S. 440 
(1937); Phelps v. Bd. of Educ., 300 U.S. 319 (1937); Henderson Co. v. Thompson, 300 U.S. 
258 (1937); Stockholders of Peoples Banking Co. v. Sterling, 300 U.S. 175 (1937); Richmond 
Mortg. & Loan Corp. v. Wachovia Bank & Tr. Co., 300 U.S. 124 (1937); Midland Realty Co. 
v. Kan. City Power & Light Co., 300 U.S. 109 (1937); Barwise v. Sheppard, 299 U.S. 33 (1936); 
Schenebeck v. McCrary, 298 U.S. 36 (1936); Int’l Steel & Iron Co. v. Nat’l Sur. Co., 297 U.S. 
657 (1936); Wright v. Cent. Ky. Nat. Gas Co., 297 U.S. 537 (1936); Ingraham v. Hanson, 297 
U.S. 378 (1936); Violet Trapping Co. v. Grace, 297 U.S. 119 (1936); Treigle v. Acme 
Homestead Ass’n, 297 U.S. 189 (1936); W.B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56 (1935); 
U.S. Mortg. Co. v. Matthews, 293 U.S. 232 (1934); Worthen, 292 U.S. 426; Seattle Gas Co. v. 
Seattle, 291 U.S. 638 (1934); Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Seattle, 291 U.S. 619 (1934).
74 Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56.
75 Id.
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property.76 The security given to the bondholders in cases of municipal default was to 
allow them to foreclose on properties of homeowners who failed to pay their 
assessment for the improvement in question.77 In the midst of the Great Depression, 
the Arkansas State Legislature responded to municipal defaults by passing debtor 
relief measures that extended the foreclosure period from sixty-five days to at least 
two and a half years and reduced the penalty on the delinquent home owner from 
twenty percent to three percent.78 For the unanimous Court, Justice Cardozo found 
that, considering all the statutorily permitted delays, “[a] minimum of six and a half 
years is thus the total period during which the holder of the mortgage is without an 
effective remedy.”79 Arkansas’s claim that it was meeting an emergency was 
unconvincing.80 Cardozo concluded, “[n]ot Blaisdell’s case, but Worthen’s . . . 
supplies the applicable rule.”81
The same year, Chief Justice Hughes further narrowed the emergency exception 
of Blaisdell in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States.82 In deciding that the 
National Recovery Act exceeded the legislative powers of Congress, and citing 
Blaisdell, Hughes declared in words that could have been written by Sutherland:
We are told that the provision of the statute authorizing the adoption of 
codes must be viewed in the light of the grave national crisis with which 
Congress was confronted. Undoubtedly, the conditions to which power is 
addressed are always to be considered when the exercise of power is 
challenged. Extraordinary conditions may call for extraordinary remedies. 
But the argument necessarily stops short of an attempt to justify action 
which lies outside the sphere of constitutional authority. Extraordinary 
conditions do not create or enlarge constitutional power.83
Also in 1935, the refinement and limitation of Blaisdell continued the same year in an 
opinion by Justice Brandeis in which he noted:
Statutes for the relief of mortgagors, when applied to pre-existing 
mortgages, have given rise, from time to time, to serious constitutional 
questions. The statutes were sustained by this [C]ourt when, as in Home 
Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, they were found to preserve 
substantially the right of the mortgagee to obtain, through application of the 
security, payment of the indebtedness. They were stricken down, as in W.B. 
                                                          
76 Id. at 57.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 60–61.
79 Id. at 61.
80 Id. at 63.
81 Id. (citation omitted).
82 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 549–50 (1935).
83 Id. at 528.
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Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, when it appeared that this substantive right was 
substantially abridged. Compare W.B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas.84
The following year, 1936, the Court—again unanimously—struck down a state 
law under the Contracts Clause in Treigle v. Acme Homestead Ass’n.85 In that case, 
Louisiana had enacted a law that removed a shareholder’s rights to recoup his 
investment and share of the profits when he withdrew from a building and loan 
association.86 Although the Acme Homestead Association asserted that the law was 
framed to deal with an existing emergency, Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, 
dismissed the argument.87 Justice Roberts asserted that the law did “not purport to deal 
with any existing emergency and the provisions respecting the rights of withdrawing 
members [were] neither temporary nor conditional. Compare W.B. Worthen Co. v. 
Thomas.”88
Thus, in three Contract Clause cases the Court heard after Blaisdell, the Court 
unanimously struck down the state statutes at issue for unconstitutionally impairing 
contracts.89 Moreover, three justices who were in the Blaisdell majority made efforts 
to restrict and limit the impact of that decision when they wrote subsequent opinions.90
By 1937, Worthen and a now limited Blaisdell solidified into a workable rule: a state 
law that materially impairs an obligation of one of the parties to a pre-existing contract 
violates the Contract Clause91 unless there is such an emergency that a narrow and 
limited exception can be permitted, but only if that exception preserves the underlying 
benefits of the contract to the parties.92
The Court had reached an extraordinary and virtually unanimous consensus. Of 
the twenty cases that the Court decided after Blaisdell through 1937 in which the 
Contract Clause was at issue, only one of them had a Justice dissent.93
                                                          
84 Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 580 (1935) (citations 
omitted) (striking down a newly enacted provision of federal bankruptcy law that had relieved 
adjudged debtors of their obligations under existing mortgage contracts. Brandeis applied 
Contract Clause jurisprudence to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
85 Treigle v. Acme Homestead Ass’n, 297 U.S. 189, 198 (1936).
86 Id. at 192.
87 Id. at 195.
88 Id. (citations omitted).
89 See, e.g., Treigle, 297 U.S. at 198; W.B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56, 57 
(1935); W.B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426 (1934).
90 See Treigle, 297 U.S. at 191; Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. at 57; Worthen, 292 U.S. at 429.
91 See Richmond Mortg. & Loan Corp. v. Wachovia Bank & Tr. Co., 300 U.S. 124, 128–
29 (1937).
92 Worthen, 292 U.S. at 432–33.
93 Hale v. State Bd. of Assessment & Review, 302 U.S. 95 (1937) (Sutherland, J., 
dissenting, joined by McReynolds and Butler, JJ.); Dodge v. Bd. of Educ., 302 U.S. 74 (1937); 
Wright v. Vinton Branch of Mountain Tr. Bank, 300 U.S. 440 (1937); Phelps v. Bd. of Educ., 
300 U.S. 319 (1937); Henderson Co. v. Thompson, 300 U.S. 258 (1937); Stockholders of 
Peoples Banking Co. v. Sterling, 300 U.S. 175 (1937); Richmond Mortg. & Loan Corp., 300 
U.S. at 124; Midland Realty Co. v. Kan. City Power & Light Co., 300 U.S. 109 (1937); Barwise 
v. Sheppard, 299 U.S. 33 (1936); Schenebeck v. McCrary, 298 U.S. 36 (1936); Int’l Steel & 
Iron Co. v. Nat’l Sur. Co., 297 U.S. 657 (1936); Wright v. Cent. Ky. Nat. Gas Co., 297 U.S. 
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Notably, in a number of cases in which the Court upheld state legislation that 
significantly altered the remedial rights of one of the parties to a contract, the Court 
emphasized that the new remedy preserved the underlying value of the contract so that 
one party would not gain a windfall benefit not contemplated in the original contract.94
The Court’s emphasis ensured that the Blaisdell exception to the general rule of the 
Contract Clause, as set forth in Worthen, remained limited. Thus, in Richmond Mortg. 
& Loan Corp. v. Wachovia Bank & Tr. Co., Justice Roberts began by stating the 
standard:
The applicable principle is not in dispute. The Legislature may modify,
limit or alter the remedy for enforcement of a contract without impairing 
its obligation, but in so doing, it may not deny all remedy or so circumscribe 
the existing remedy with conditions and restrictions as seriously to impair 
the value of the right. The particular remedy existing at the date of the 
contract may be altogether abrogated if another equally effective for the 
enforcement of the obligation remains or is substituted for the one taken 
away.95
But, he continued, in this particular case: 
The act alters and modifies one of the existing remedies for realization of 
the value of the security, but cannot fairly be said to do more than restrict 
the mortgagee to that for which he contracted, namely, payment in full. It 
recognizes the obligation of his contract and his right to its full enforcement 
but limits that right so as to prevent his obtaining more than his due.96
Chief Justice Hughes applied the same rationale two years later in Honeyman v. 
Jacobs.97 Also, in a similar case two years after Honeyman, Justice Douglas declared, 
“[m]ortgagees are constitutionally entitled to no more than payment in full.”98 Thus, 
the Worthen rule prevailed.
V. TRANSITION
In sum, contrary to the traditional tale, the Blaisdell/Worthen rule survived the 
judicial revolution of 1937 through 1938, though there were signs of impending 
changes. In 1938, Justice Van Devanter resigned, and Justice Hugo Black replaced 
                                                          
537 (1936); Ingraham v. Hanson, 297 U.S. 378 (1936); Violet Trapping Co. v. Grace, 297 U.S. 
119 (1936); Treigle, 297 U.S. 189; Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56; U.S. Mortg. Co. v. Matthews, 293 
U.S. 232 (1934); Worthen, 292 U.S. 426; Seattle Gas Co. v. Seattle, 291 U.S. 638 (1934); Puget 
Sound Power & Light Co. v. Seattle, 291 U.S. 619 (1934).
94 See, e.g., Richmond Mortg. & Loan Corp., 300 U.S. at 128–29.
95 Id. (footnotes omitted).
96 Id. at 130.
97 Honeyman v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 539, 542 (1939) (affirming appellant’s purchase of a 
foreclosure mortgage, but overruling his motion for a deficiency judgment per new regulation, 
§ 1083a of the Civil Practice Act of New York).
98 Gelfert v. Nat’l City Bank, 313 U.S. 221, 233 (1941) (footnote omitted).
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him.99 Justice Sutherland was no longer on the Court, and Justice Cardozo was too ill 
to participate in most of the Court’s business.100 Nonetheless, the Court did invalidate 
an Indiana law under the Contract Clause, but did so on grounds that could make future 
invocations of the Clause’s protection more problematical.101
The Indiana Teachers’ Tenure Act of 1927, which was incorporated into teachers’ 
contracts with school districts, provided tenure to teachers who served for five years; 
the law permitted subsequent termination solely for just cause.102 However, the 1927 
Act was repealed in 1933 for certain classes of jurisdictions, such as townships as 
opposed to cities.103 Subsequently, a tenured teacher in a township had her contract 
terminated.104 She challenged the termination and ultimately the Supreme Court 
decided her case in 1938 in Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand.105 The Court held that 
the repeal of the Tenure Act of 1927 violated the Contracts Clause.106 Yet, in 
articulating the rule, Justice Roberts took the bite out of future invocations of the 
Contract Clause by lowering the level of scrutiny to be applied:
Our decisions recognize that every contract is made subject to the implied 
condition that its fulfillment may be frustrated by a proper exercise of the 
police power but we have repeatedly said that, in order to have this effect, 
the exercise of the power must be for an end which is in fact public and the 
means adopted must be reasonably adapted to that end, and the Supreme 
Court of Indiana has taken the same view in respect of legislation impairing 
the obligation of the contract of a state instrumentality.107
In this case, however, the Court found that “the repeal of the earlier act by the later 
was not an exercise of the police power for the attainment of ends to which its exercise 
may properly be directed.”108 In effect, the decision was based on a hidden Equal 
Protection grounding because Roberts, who wrote for the majority, thought the law’s 
distinction between townships and cities was irrational.109 In his dissent, Justice Black 
began a campaign to disable the Contract Clause, asserting that the teacher held her 
                                                          
99 Willis Van Devanter, 1911–1937, SUP. CT. HIST. SOC’Y,
http://supremecourthistory.org/timeline_devanter.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2018).
100 See Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 109 (1938) (“Justice Cardozo took 
no part in the consideration or decision of this case.”); George Sutherland, 1922–1938, SUP. CT.
HIS. SOC’Y, http://supremecourthistory.org/timeline_sutherland.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2018) 
(noting that Justice Sutherland retired on January 17, 1938).
101 Brand, 303 U.S. at 108–09.
102 Id. at 102–03.
103 Id. at 104.
104 Id. at 97.
105 Id. at 95.
106 Id. at 109.
107 Id. at 108–09, n.17 (citing Treigle v. Acme Homestead Ass’n, 297 U.S. 189, 197 (1936); 
W.B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56, 60 (1935); W.B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 
U.S. 426, 431–32 (1934); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 438 (1934)).
108 Id. at 109.
109 Id.
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position not under a contract, but under a statute regulating economic policy over 
which the state has plenary discretion subject only to the checks of the state’s political 
process.110
In 1941, Justice Roberts had one last hurrah for the Contract Clause in Wood v. 
Lovett.111 In 1935, the Arkansas State Legislature passed a statute that guaranteed 
distressed sale purchasers of land clear title despite irregularities in proceedings prior 
to the sale.112 In those disrupted economic times, Arkansas wanted such purchasers to 
enjoy clear title.113 But in 1937, Arkansas repealed the law, placing earlier land 
purchasers at risk of having their titles contested.114 By a 5–3 vote, the Court voided 
the repeal statute.115 Justice Black again dissented, and this time Justices Douglas and 
Murphy joined.116 In his dissent, Black emphasized the sovereign capacity of the state 
to alter its land and taxation statutes.117 Citing Blaisdell no less than nineteen times, 
Black made it the centerpiece of his theory of the Contract Clause.118 He maintained 
that “[t]he Blaisdell decision represented a realistic appreciation of the fact that ours 
is an evolving society and that the general words of the [C]ontract [C]lause were not 
intended to reduce the legislative branch of government to helpless impotency.”119
Neither the majority nor Justice Black mentioned Worthen.120
Justice Black’s position soon became the norm as the Court accorded more and 
more deference to states’ judgment in exercising their police power over economic 
affairs.121 To illustrate, in 1940, the Court upheld New Jersey legislation that revised 
the rights of shareholders of building and loan associations against a Contract Clause 
challenge.122 For the Court, Justice Reed had declared:
In Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell this Court considered 
the authority retained by the state over contracts “to safeguard the vital 
interests of its people.” The rule that all contracts are made subject to this 
paramount authority was there reiterated. Such authority is not limited to 
health, morals and safety. It extends to economic needs as well. Utility rate 
                                                          
110 Id. at 110 (Black, J., dissenting).
111 Wood v. Lovett, 313 U.S. 362 (1941).
112 Id. at 364–65.
113 Id. at 367.
114 Id. at 365.
115 Id. at 366, 372.
116 Id. at 372, 386 (Black, J., dissenting).
117 Id. at 376–77.
118 Id. at 372–86.
119 Id. at 383 (citing Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass’n, 310 U.S. 32, 38 (1940)).
120 See id. at 362–86 (omitting any mention of Worthen).
121 Id. at 372 (Black, J., dissenting).
122 Veix, 310 U.S. at 38.
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contracts give way to this power, as do contractual arrangements between 
landlords and tenants.123
Reed gave no emergency or strict scrutiny-like qualification.124 Thus, there was a 
transition from the strict scrutiny standard applied and endorsed in Worthen to 
deference to the state over economic legislation pursuant to the police power.
VI. BLAISDELL REDUX
By 1945, the Court was prepared to give the coup de grace. Every year since 1933, 
New York State passed one-year moratoriums on foreclosure proceedings on 
mortgages that were in default.125 In 1944, the East New York Savings Bank brought 
a foreclosure proceeding in which it contested the constitutionality of New York’s 
latest moratorium act.126 In his opinion for the Court, Justice Frankfurter made no 
mention of Worthen.127 Instead, he raised Blaisdell to the highest level of authority and 
took it far beyond the limitations that Hughes originally established in the case and in 
his subsequent refinements:
Since Home Bldg. & L[oan] Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, there are left 
hardly any open spaces of controversy concerning the constitutional 
restrictions of the Contract Clause upon moratory legislation referable to 
the depression. The comprehensive opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Hughes in 
that case cut beneath the skin of words to the core of meaning. After a full 
review of the whole course of decisions expounding the Contract Clause—
covering almost the life of this Court—the Chief Justice . . . put the Clause 
in its proper perspective in our constitutional framework. The Blaisdell case 
and decisions rendered since (e.g., Honeyman v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 539; Veix
v. Sixth Ward Ass’n, 310 U.S. 32; Gelfert v. National City Bank, 313 U.S. 
221; Faitoute Co. v. Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502), yield this governing 
constitutional principle: when a widely diffused public interest has become 
enmeshed in a network of multitudinous private arrangements, the 
authority of the State “to safeguard the vital interests of its people,” 290 
U.S. at 434, is not to be gainsaid by abstracting one such arrangement from 
its public context and treating it as though it were an isolated private 
contract constitutionally immune from impairment.128
Justice Frankfurter further invalidated the belief that deference was due to a legislature 
only in emergency situations, declaring, “[j]ustification for the 1943 enactment is not 
negatived because the factors that induced and constitutionally supported its 
                                                          
123 Id. at 38–39 (footnotes and citations omitted).
124 Id. at 39.
125 In 1941, the extension had been for two years. E.N.Y. Sav. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 
231 (1945).
126 Id. at 230–31.
127 Id. at 230–35 (omitting any mention of Worthen).
128 Id. at 231–32 (quoting Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 434 (1934))
(citing Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502 (1942); Gelfert v. Nat’l 
City Bank, 313 U.S. 221, 233 (1941); Veix, 310 U.S. at 32; Honeyman v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 539 
(1939)).
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enactment were different from those which induced and supported the moratorium 
statute of 1933.”129 Frankfurter’s opinion was a wilful distortion of history and 
precedent to accommodate a new role for the Court.
The post-New Deal Court decided that it was inappropriate for a judicial body to 
second-guess economic decisions by legislative bodies, whether state legislatures or 
Congress.130 It also pronounced that the property protections in specific parts of the 
Constitution, such as the Contract Clause and the Takings Clause, had to become 
issues determinable by the political branches.131
Frankfurter’s revised Blaisdell-centric reinterpretation of the Contract Clause 
stuck. Twenty years later, in El Paso v. Simmons, Justice White championed 
Frankfurter’s position.132 In that case, land purchased from, but forfeited to, the State 
of Texas could be reclaimed under certain conditions.133 Texas later passed a law 
limiting the period for a reinstatement claim to five years.134 On an assertion of a 
Contract Clause violation, the Supreme Court found for El Paso, which had bought 
the land from the State.135 Justice White declared:
The Blaisdell opinion, which amounted to a comprehensive restatement of 
the principles underlying the application of the Contract Clause, makes it 
quite clear that “[n]ot only is the constitutional provision qualified by the 
measure of control which the state retains over remedial processes, but the 
state also continues to possess authority to safeguard the vital interests of 
its people. It does not matter that legislation appropriate to that end ‘has the 
result of modifying or abrogating contracts already in effect.’ Stephenson
v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251, 276. Not only are existing laws read into contracts 
in order to fix obligations as between the parties, but the reservation of 
essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a 
postulate of the legal order. . . .” [Blaisdell], 290 U.S.[] at 434–35. 
Moreover, the “economic interests of the state may justify the exercise of 
its continuing and dominant protective power notwithstanding interference 
with contracts.” Id.[] at 437. The State has the “sovereign right . . . to protect 
the . . . general welfare of the people . . . . Once we are in this domain of 
the reserve power of a State we must respect the ‘wide discretion on the 
part of the legislature in determining what is and what is not necessary.’” 
East New York Savings Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 232–33.136
                                                          
129 Id. at 235.
130 Id. at 234.
131 Id. at 232.
132 El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 508–09 (1965).
133 Id. at 498–99.
134 Id. at 499.
135 Id. at 509.
136 Id. at 508–09 (first quoting Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251, 276 (1932); then 
quoting Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 434–35, 437 (1934); then quoting 
E.N.Y. Sav. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 232–33 (1945)).
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On the other hand, Justice Black, who a quarter century earlier championed Blaisdell
and the near unfettered discretion of the state to order economic relationships, now 
dissented and took the opposite position:
The cases the Court mentions do not support its reasoning. Home Building 
& Loan Ass[’]n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, which the Court seems to think 
practically read the Contract Clause out of the Constitution, actually did no 
such thing, as the Blaisdell opinion read in its entirety shows and as 
subsequent decisions of this Court were careful to point out. . . . Chief 
Justice Hughes, the author of Blaisdell, later reiterated and emphasized that 
that case had upheld only a temporary restraint which provided for 
compensation, when four months later he spoke for the Court in striking 
down a law which did not. W.B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426.137
After Justice Black passed away in 1971,138 there was a brief, but ultimately pallid, 
resurgence of the Contract Clause. In United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, the Court 
invalidated the repeal of a statutory covenant.139 The covenant guaranteed to 
bondholders that revenues from a public transportation system would not be diverted 
to subsidize upgrades and maintenance.140 Justice Blackmun’s opinion asserted that 
the Contract Clause had greater bite when applied to a state’s repudiation of its own 
contracts and imposed a middle-tier test: “The Contract Clause is not an absolute bar 
to subsequent modification of a State’s own financial obligations. As with laws 
impairing the obligations of private contracts, an impairment may be constitutional if 
it is reasonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose.”141 The opinion 
did not mention Worthen.142
A year later, in Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, the Court voided a 
Minnesota law that forced a revision of a private company’s pension obligations.143
There, Justice Stewart accurately summarized the law emanating from Blaisdell and 
Worthen, emphasizing how limited Blaisdell’s reach was.144 However, instead of 
applying the Blaisdell/Worthen standard, he simply ignored it and proceeded to 
continue the middle-tier test from Justice Blackmun’s opinion in United States Trust:
“the first inquiry must be whether the state law has, in fact, operated as a substantial 
impairment of a contractual relationship.”145 If the answer to that question is 
                                                          
137 Id. at 523–24, 526 (Black, J., dissenting) (first citing Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 398; then 
citing W.B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426 (1934)).
138 Justice Black Dies at 85; Served on Court 34 Years, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 1971), 
https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/bday/0227.html#to
p.
139 U.S. Tr. Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 32 (1977).
140 Id.
141 Id. at 25 (footnote omitted).
142 Id.
143 Allied Structural Steel v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 243 (1978).
144 Id. at 242–43.
145 Id. at 244 (footnote omitted).
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affirmative, then, was the legislation “necessary to meet an important general social 
problem”?146
Allied Structural Steel was the high point, such as it was, of the Contract Clause’s 
effectiveness in the years after the New Deal. A few years later in Energy Reserves 
Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., a unanimous Court found for the state, 
weakening the middle-tier test.147 “If the state regulation constitutes a substantial 
impairment, the State, in justification, must have a significant and legitimate public 
purpose behind the regulation,” but when the state is not a party to the contract, “courts 
properly defer to legislative judgment as to the necessity and reasonableness of a 
particular measure.”148 Subsequent cases returned to the near total deferential model 
invented by Justice Frankfurter in 1946.149 In fact, since Allied Structural Steel, the 
Supreme Court has not voided any state law under the Contract Clause.150
VII. CONCLUSION
In 1934, by folding Blaisdell into Worthen, the Supreme Court reached a workable 
standard under which courts could judge cases where state legislation impaired pre-
existing contracts: a state law that materially impaired an obligation of one of the 
parties to a pre-existing contract violated the Contract Clause unless there was such 
an emergency that a narrow and limited exception could be permitted and which 
exception preserved the underlying benefits of the contract to the parties.151 The near-
unbroken run of unanimous decisions following Worthen through the 1930s 
demonstrates that a workable consensus was reached.
Following the post-New Deal judiciary that believed that the validity of economic 
and social legislation should be left to the state’s political branches to decide, all that 
remains of the Contract Clause’s protective sweep is an asymmetric middle-tier test 
that has little analytic benefit and virtually no legal effect.
The 1930s was different. In the midst of an era when the Court struggled with the 
appropriate constitutional doctrine to use in judging economic disputes, Worthen v. 
Thomas and its redefinition of Blaisdell worked with hardly a ripple. It could work 
again.
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